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But breaking up, as the adage goes, is hard to do.
That conclusion is evident from a Bloomberg Intelligence analysis of Apple<\/a> Inc., which is trying to reduce its dependence on China. The Cupertino, California-based company company already started producing some iPhone 14 models in India, in an earlier than usual move for new models. And Apple’s largest supplier, Foxconn Technology Group<\/a>, recently agreed to a $300 million expansion of its production facilities in Vietnam.
But Bloomberg Intelligence estimates it would take about eight years to move just 10% of Apple’s production capacity out of China, where roughly 98% of the company’s iPhones<\/a> have been made. Scores of local component suppliers -- not to mention modern and efficient transport, communication and electricity supplies -- make it particularly difficult to get out of the world’s second-largest economy.
“With China accounting for 70% of global smartphone manufacturing and leading Chinese vendors accounting for nearly half of global shipments, the region has a well-developed supply chain, which will be tough to replicate -- and one Apple could lose access to if it moves,” BI’s report from analysts Steven Tseng and Woo Jin Ho said.
An Apple spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.
It’s one thing to look outside China for other makers of toys and t-shirts. But US technology firms invested more than two decades, and tens of billions of dollars, setting up complex production chains to provide essential goods for the e-commerce boom. Unwinding those ties could end up taking just as long, and may result in lasting damage to an already battered global economy.
Of course, unanticipated events -- like Europe and America’s rupture with Russia -- provide a potent reminder of both the systemic risks of deep economic integration and the speed at which decoupling can occur.
Political headwinds in the US have been steadily leaning against US-Chinese integration. Under President Joe Biden, the $615 billion US-China trade relationship has simmered into a cold war following the commercial tensions under Trump that resulted in tariffs on a collective $360 billion worth of bilateral goods, along with US sanctions on key Chinese technology manufacturers like Huawei Technologies Co Ltd.
The pandemic then ushered in President Xi Jinping’s strict virus-containment policies, which essentially barred travel and has left major areas locked down for extended periods of time. Rising tensions over US ties with Taiwan and China’s unprecedented scale of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait have become the latest flashpoint offering a case for decoupling.
“There was some momentum in this direction as a consequence of the trade war and the pandemic,” Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said about decoupling. “The Shanghai lockdown was really a monster accelerant. And the cross-strait crisis in early August added more fuel to the fire.”
Yet the Biden administration’s reshoring strategy -- or “friend-shoring” as termed by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen -- remains a lofty but unfulfilled ambition, as far as the data go.
US firms had $90 billion directly invested in China at the end of 2020, and despite all the talk of decoupling, added another $2.5 billion in 2021, according to data compiled by China’s commerce ministry. The actual total is likely even higher, because some businesses are thought by analysts to route some investments through Hong Kong, or via tax havens like the Cayman and Virgin Islands.
US tech supply chains in China rely on firms from Taiwan and elsewhere as well as domestic Chinese firms, increasing the level of dependence further.
Friendshoring Reticence<\/strong>
Furthermore, America’s allies aren’t exactly swayed by Yellen’s “friend-shoring” concept. Key US partners like Singapore warned the Biden administration that isolating China could destabilize the global economy and potentially “sleepwalk” the world’s largest economies into a dangerous conflict.
“Such actions shut off avenues for regional growth and cooperation, deepen divisions between countries and may precipitate the very conflicts that we all hope to avoid,” Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said following Biden’s visit to the region in May.
That’s not to say untangling the tech supply chains that link the US with China isn’t already happening to some extent. A Sept. 23 report from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. found that the share of US tech imports coming directly from China has declined by 10 percentage points since 2017, “mainly on moderating China mobile phone exports.”
Apple’s exposure to China is also notably bigger than many others. Amazon.com Inc.<\/a>, HP Inc.<\/a>, Microsoft Corp<\/a>., Cisco Systems Inc<\/a>. and Dell Technologies Inc.<\/a> also depend on China to produce hardware for servers, storage and networking products, but the extent of their dependence is far below that of Apple.
Bloomberg Intelligence says that overall tech-industry dependence could be reduced by 20%-40% “in most cases” by 2030. For hardware and electronic manufacturers, they could reduce their reliance<\/a> on the Chinese market to 20%-30% over the next decade, BI calculates.
The Biden administration is taking a two-pronged approach to weakening economic ties with China that simultaneously incentivizes companies to shift their production via subsidies and penalizes investment in China via tariffs and export controls.
This summer, Biden signed two pieces of legislation -- the Chips and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act -- that contain provisions to help bolster domestic manufacturing of certain strategic goods like semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries and pharmaceuticals.
The legislation bars companies that access the program’s $52.7 billion in federal funding from materially expanding production of chips more advanced than 28-nanometers in China -- or a country of concern like Russia -- for 10 years.
Also this year, the US administration expanded curbs on sending US semiconductors to China, with new license requirements to sell chip-making equipment to factories that produce 14-nanometer or more advanced chips.
US industry officials are developing contingency plans in anticipation of more barriers to US-China trade and expect the Biden administration to trigger a slate of additional export restrictions sometime this fall.
While there’s the potential for a political reset between Biden and Xi on the sidelines of the upcoming Group of 20 leaders summit in Bali, expectations for a grand détente remain low.
“I don’t see any breakthroughs coming out of the Xi-Biden meeting,” said Wendy Cutler, a former US trade negotiator and vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
Meanwhile, private-sector sentiment has also deteriorated.
A recent survey from the US-China Business Council found that US firms’ optimism about China has already fallen to a record low and evolving challenges -- like China’s Covid Zero policy, power cuts and geopolitical tensions -- have caused more than half of surveyed companies to delay or cancel planned investments in China.
Nearly a quarter of the survey respondents said they’ve moved segments of their supply chains out of China over the past year.
But it’s not exactly an exodus from China. A common approach has become “China Plus One” -- whereby China remains a core production base, and any additional capacity is added in South and Southeast Asian nations like India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.
Last year, US firms pledged to invest about $740 million in Vietnam, the most since 2017 and more than double the amount in 2020.
Taiwan itself remains a vital but vulnerable component of US supply chains. Led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd., the island currently manufactures more than 90% of the world’s most advanced chips used for military and corporate computing services. Apple, MediaTek and Qualcomm<\/a>, which control more than 85% of the global handset chip market, all rely on TSMC’s supply.
Taiwan is expected to remain the key manufacturing hub for cutting-edge chips over the next five years, according to the Bloomberg Intelligence report.
China’s booming market also underscores the opportunity cost for US suppliers. Some 19 of the world’s 20 fastest-growing chip industry firms over the past four quarters, on average, are based in China, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
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苹果的供应链技术显示了中国倾销的困难
是一回事中国以外寻找其他玩具制造商和t恤衫。但美国科技公司投资逾二十年,和数百亿美元,建立复杂的生产链为电子商务提供必需品繁荣。
读到
但正如谚语所说,分手,是很难做到的。
这个结论是明显的从彭博情报分析苹果Inc .)正试图减少对中国的依赖。加州库比蒂诺的公司公司已经开始生产一些iPhone 14模型在印度,在一个比平常早搬的新模型。和苹果最大的供应商,富士康科技集团最近同意3亿美元扩大其在越南生产设施。
但彭博情报估计仅需要大约八年中国苹果的生产能力的10%,约98%的公司iphone了。大量当地零部件供应商——更不用说现代和高效的交通、通信和电力供应,使它特别困难的世界第二大经济体。
”,中国占全球智能手机的70%制造业和中国领先供应商占近一半的全球出货量,该地区有一个成熟的供应链,将很难复制,一个苹果可以失去如果它移动时,“BI报告的分析师史蒂文曾和吸引金Ho说。
苹果发言人没有回复记者的置评请求。
是一回事中国以外寻找其他玩具制造商和t恤衫。但美国科技公司投资逾二十年,和数百亿美元,建立复杂的生产链为电子商务提供必需品繁荣。解除那些最终可能花一样长时间的关系,并可能导致持久的损害全球经济已经遭受重创。
当然,意外事件——就像欧洲和美国与俄罗斯的破裂——提供了一个有力的提醒深度经济一体化的系统性风险和速度会发生分离。
美国的政治阻力一直在稳步靠着美中集成。总统拜登(Joe Biden)下,6150亿美元的中美贸易关系已经炖成冷战后在特朗普的商业紧张导致集体价值3600亿美元的双边关税商品,随着美国的制裁等关键中国技术制造商华为技术有限公司。
大流行之后迎来了习近平副主席的严格virus-containment政策,这实质上禁止旅游和使锁定主要地区长时间。紧张局势对美国与台湾和中国的关系前所未有的台湾海峡的军事演习规模已成为最新的热点提供解耦。
“有一些势头在这个方向由于贸易战争和大流行,”斯科特•肯尼迪高级顾问在华盛顿战略与国际研究中心对解耦。“上海封锁真是一个怪物触媒。8月初和两岸危机增加了更多的燃料火。”
然而,拜登政府重新支撑战略——或“friend-shoring”称为美国财长叶伦——仍然是一个崇高的但未实现的雄心,至于数据。
我们公司有900亿美元在2020年底在中国直接投资,尽管人们都在说的解耦,添加另一个25亿年的2021美元,由中国商务部数据显示。实际总可能更高,因为一些企业认为通过香港分析师路由一些投资,或通过避税天堂如开曼和维尔京群岛。
美国科技在中国供应链依靠公司从台湾和其他地方以及中国国内公司,进一步提高水平的依赖。
Friendshoring沉默
此外,美国的盟友不完全受叶伦的“friend-shoring”的概念。等主要美国合作伙伴新加坡拜登政府警告说,孤立中国可能破坏全球经济稳定和潜在的“梦游”是世界上最大的经济体为危险的冲突。
”这样的行为关闭区域增长和合作途径,加深国家之间的分歧,可能会沉淀,我们都希望避免冲突,”新加坡总理李显龙(Lee Hsien Loong)说,拜登的访问该地区。
这并不是说解开科技供应链链接美国与中国在某种程度上已经不是这样了。高盛集团(Goldman Sachs Group inc .) 9月23日的一份报告发现,美国科技直接从中国进口的份额自2017年以来下降了10个基点,“以缓和中国手机出口。”
苹果的暴露在中国也明显比其他许多人。Amazon.com Inc .。,惠普公司。,微软(msft . o:行情)。,思科(csco . o:行情)。和戴尔技术公司。也取决于中国生产硬件服务器、存储和网络产品,但他们依赖的程度远低于苹果。
彭博的情报说,总体科技行业的依赖可能降低20% -40% 2030年“大多数情况下”。对硬件和电子制造商,他们可以减少依赖在中国市场的20% - -30%在接下来的十年,BI计算。
拜登政府采取了双管齐下的方法来削弱与中国的经济关系,同时鼓励公司将通过补贴和惩罚他们的生产在华投资通过关税和出口管制。
今年夏天,拜登签署了两项立法——芯片和科学行为和减少通货膨胀——包含规定采取行动帮助提振国内制造业的某些战略商品半导体、电动车、电池和药品。
立法禁止美国企业访问计划的527亿美元的联邦资金从物质上扩大生产的芯片更先进的比胡伟武在中国关注的——或者一个国家如俄罗斯——10年。
今年,美国政府扩大限制向中国派遣美国半导体,与新的许可证要求芯片制造设备卖给工厂生产14-nanometer或更高级的芯片。
美国行业官员正在开发应急计划的预期更多的美中贸易壁垒和拜登预计政府引发的额外的出口限制在今年秋季的某个时候。
而拜登之间潜在的政治重置和习近平在即将召开的20国集团(g20)领导人峰会的间隙在巴厘岛,预期的大缓和仍然很低。
“我看不出任何突破的Xi-Biden会议,”温迪·卡特勒说,美国前贸易谈判代表和副总裁亚洲社会政策研究所。
与此同时,私营部门的信心也在恶化。
美中贸易全国委员会的最近的一项调查发现,美国公司对中国乐观已经跌至纪录低点,不断变化的挑战——就像中国的Covid零政策,断电和地缘政治紧张,造成超过一半的受访企业推迟或取消计划在中国投资。
近四分之一的受访者表示,他们已经部分的供应链从中国过去一年。
但是它不完全是一个来自中国的《出埃及记》。常见的方法已经成为“中国+ 1”——即中国仍是一个核心生产基地,和任何额外的能力被添加在南亚和东南亚国家如印度、越南、马来西亚、泰国和印度尼西亚。
去年,我们公司承诺将投资7.4亿美元在越南,最自2017年以来,超过2020年的两倍。
台湾本身仍然是一个重要但脆弱的组成部分,我们的供应链。由台湾半导体制造有限公司,台湾目前生产超过90%的世界上最先进的芯片用于军事和企业计算服务。苹果,联发科和高通控制超过85%的全球手机芯片市场,所有依赖于台积电的供应。
台湾的主要制造业中心预计将保持尖端芯片在未来5年内,根据彭博情报报告。
中国蓬勃发展的市场也凸显了机会成本为我们的供应商。一些19世界20增长最快的芯片行业公司在过去四个季度,平均而言,是建立在中国,据彭博社采集数据显示。
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