\n
Sebi is also examining whether price-sensitive information<\/a> was disclosed to Tata Sons directors and Tata Trusts<\/a> nominees before it was approved by the boards of operating companies.
\n
\n“We are taking note of the events unfolding at Tata companies and examining whether there has been any securities law violations,” said a senior Sebi official. He declined to elaborate further but added that the regulator will make up its mind in the next few days.
\n
\nA Tata Group spokesperson, replying to an ET questionnaire, said the group has a view on the subject and it will convey it to Sebi. He declined to elaborate.
\n
\nSebi insider-trading rules stipulate that price-sensitive information be shared only on a needto-know basis and that executives who don’t have to decide on the matter should not be informed before the board decision. This need-to-know list includes only board members, not outsiders including relatives of the promoter family.
\n
\nCyrus Mistry said that the CEO of Tata Power had made presentations to Tata Sons board on the utility major’s proposed acquisition of Welspun Renewables and that key Tata Trusts trustees were part of the discussions.
\n
\nThe former chairman in a mail to the Tata Sons board on October 25 also said that Trusts' directors (Nitin Nohria and Vijay Singh) left a Tata Sons board meeting in progress, keeping the board waiting for almost an hour, to obtain instructions from Ratan Tata.
\n
\n'SUPERBOARD’' STRUCTURE GOES AGAINST THE RULES<\/strong>
\n“Such a work pattern has also created the added risk of contravening insider-trading rules,” Mistry had said. After the mail became public, it was, for the first time, also revealed that strategic decisions like acquisitions and capex initiatives undertaken by Tata entities required the approval of the Tata Sons board with majority votes from the Tata Trusts-nominated directors.
\n
\nArticle 121 of Articles of Association (AoA) of Tata Sons states that certain strategic decisions of operating companies have to be ratified by the Tata Sons board. For the resolution to pass, it required an “affirmative vote” of a majority of directors nominated by Tata Trusts on the Tata Sons board. This (majority vote by Tata Trusts nominated directors) was incorporated in 2014.
\n
\nCorporate governance experts and lawyers were sharply critical of this practice. A former Sebi chairman said this (rules of engagement) is against the spirit of Sebi’s insider-trading rules and the Companies Act. The Tata Group has 29 publicly listed companies. “As a result of the AoA, all Tata companies, in effect have a superboard which is not accountable to the shareholders of individual companies, who face the risk of losing value in the process,” said Rajiv Kumar, senior fellow, Centre for Policy Research.
\n
\nThe ‘superboard’ structure goes against the rules that requires boards of every listed company to be independent and autonomous and take standalone decisions keeping the best interest of the company. Section 166 of the Companies Act states that a director of a company shall act in good faith to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and in the best interests of the company.
\n
\n“Although the directors are appointed by the shareholders of the company, their primary duty is to the company and they are legally bound to act in the best interests of the company and not in the best interests of its majority shareholders,” said Sandeep Parekh, founder of Finsec Law Advisors and who was an executive director of Sebi. Cyrus Mistry was the first chairman of Tata Sons in the history of the 148-year-old Tata Group who was not a chairman of Tata Trusts, mainly Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and Sir Ratan Tata Trust, which holds 66% of Tata Sons. He didn’t have absolute power like his predecessor Ratan Tata, who was the chairman of both.
\n
\nREGULATION 3<\/strong>
\nRegulation 3 of the insider-trading rules specifies that unpublished price-sensitive information should be shared strictly on a need-toknow basis and not communicated to others who are not involved in the transaction irrespective of their position in the company or their relationship with promoters and senior management.
\n
\nThis rule was buttressed by Sebi in its October 3 order which pulled up Piramal Enterprises and its main promoters, Ajay and Swati Piramal, for disclosing unpublished price-sensitive information to their son Anand Piramal about a transaction. Anand, although a part of the promoter group, was neither a director nor an employee of the company.
\n
\nThe Tata issue here is a little different. One of the reasons behind Mistry’s ouster was supposed to be his reluctance to communicate early on to the Tata Sons board about Tata Power’s decision to buy the renewable energy business of Welspun Renewables. Tata Sons was peeved that the communication was made to them after the approval of the deal by the Tata Power board and the signing of the shareholders agreement. They also wanted a say in the decision as Tata Sons is a major shareholder in Tata Power. They admitted, however, that Tata Sons board was informed about the decision to buy Welspun Power.
\n
\nWhether this requirement violates Sebi’s insider-trading rules remains to be seen. Some corporate lawyers, including Parekh of Finsec Advisors, think it does. “Sebi’s rules are clear that no insider should communicate, provide or allow access to unpublished price-sensitive information relating to a company to any person including other insiders,” said Suhail Nathani, managing partner, Economic Laws Practice.
\n
\n“Confidential information pertaining to the deal revealed by the officials of Tata Power to the board of Tata Sons violates provisions of the Companies Act as well as Sebi’s insider-trading regulations,” said Parekh.\n\n<\/body>","next_sibling":[{"msid":55305099,"title":"New foreign capital policy won't help Tata-Docomo like disputes","entity_type":"ARTICLE","link":"\/news\/new-foreign-capital-policy-wont-help-tata-docomo-like-disputes\/55305099","category_name":null,"category_name_seo":"telecomnews"}],"related_content":[],"msid":55305206,"entity_type":"ARTICLE","title":"Disclosure of price-sensitive info: Sebi examining relation between Tata Sons & companies","synopsis":"Sebi is also examining whether price-sensitive information was disclosed to Tata Sons directors and Tata Trusts nominees before it was approved by the boards of operating companies.","titleseo":"telecomnews\/disclosure-of-price-sensitive-info-sebi-examining-relation-between-tata-sons-companies","status":"ACTIVE","authors":[{"author_name":"Reena Zachariah","author_link":"\/author\/479200600\/reena-zachariah","author_image":"https:\/\/etimg.etb2bimg.com\/authorthumb\/479200600.cms?width=100&height=100&hostid=268","author_additional":{"thumbsize":false,"msid":479200600,"author_name":"Reena Zachariah","author_seo_name":"reena-zachariah","designation":"Editor","agency":false}}],"Alttitle":{"minfo":""},"artag":"ET Bureau","artdate":"2016-11-08 09:22:42","lastupd":"2016-11-08 09:24:38","breadcrumbTags":["industry","sebi","Tata Sons","Tata Trusts","price-sensitive information","tatamistry"],"secinfo":{"seolocation":"telecomnews\/disclosure-of-price-sensitive-info-sebi-examining-relation-between-tata-sons-companies"}}" data-authors="[" reena zachariah"]" data-category-name="" data-category_id="" data-date="2016-11-08" data-index="article_1">
披露股价敏感信息:印度证券交易委员会检查Tata Sons &公司之间的关系
印度证券交易委员会也在调查价格敏感信息是否披露Tata Sons董事和塔塔信托提名之前运营公司董事会的批准。
孟买,印度证券交易委员会(印度证券交易委员会)做一个初步审查之间的安排塔塔的儿子和集团公司了解它是否与当前的内幕交易规定是相符合的。
印度证券交易委员会也在研究是否股价敏感信息向塔塔桑董事和披露塔塔信托提名之前运营公司董事会的批准。
“我们注意到事件展开的塔塔公司和检查是否有任何违反证券法,”印度证券交易委员会的一位高级官员说。他拒绝进一步透露,但补充说,监管机构将下定决心在接下来的几天里。
塔塔集团的一位发言人,回复一个问卷,表示,该集团已在这个问题上,将传达到印度证券交易委员会。他拒绝详细说明。
Sebi内幕交易规则规定,价格敏感信息被共享只有needto-know基础上和高管没有决定之前的事不应该通知董事会的决定。这应只包括董事会成员名单,不是外人,包括启动子的亲属的家庭。
居鲁士Mistry说,塔塔电力了演讲的首席执行官Tata Sons Welspun董事会的效用主要的收购可再生能源和关键塔塔信托受托人是讨论的一部分。
邮件的前主席Tata Sons委员会于10月25日还说,信托公司的董事(Nitin Nohria和维杰辛格)留下了Tata Sons董事会会议,董事会保持等待将近一个小时,获得Ratan Tata的指示。
SUPERBOARD”结构是违反规定的
“这样的工作模式也违反内幕交易规则创造了额外的风险,”Mistry说。邮件被公开后,这是第一次,还透露,战略决策等并购和资本支出计划由塔塔实体需要批准,塔塔桑塔塔的多数选票Trusts-nominated董事会。
章程第121条(AoA)的塔塔桑州的某些战略决策运营公司塔塔的儿子董事会批准。决议的通过,它需要一个“赞成票”多数董事的提名,塔塔塔塔桑董事会信托。这塔塔(多数投票通过信托提名董事)成立于2014年。
公司治理专家和律师们的尖锐批评这种做法。前印度证券交易委员会主席说,这(交战规则)是对印度证券交易委员会的内幕交易规则的精神和公司的行为。塔塔集团有29家上市公司。”作为农产品协定的结果,所有的塔塔公司,实际上有一个不是superboard负责个别公司的股东,他们面临贬值的风险在这一过程中,“Rajiv Kumar说,政策研究中心高级研究员。
superboard的结构违反了规则,要求所有上市公司的董事会是独立和自主,独立的决策使公司的最佳利益。Section 166的公司法规定,公司董事应当诚实守信,促进公司的对象为其成员的利益作为一个整体,在该公司的最佳利益。
“尽管公司的董事由股东任命,他们的主要职责是对公司也受到法律的约束,在该公司的最佳利益,而不是在其多数股东的最佳利益,”Sandeep帕克尔说的创始人Finsec法律顾问和印度证券交易委员会的执行董事。居鲁士Mistry历史上是第一个主席塔塔桑148岁的塔塔集团的主席不是塔塔信托基金,主要是塔塔先生Dorabji信任和Ratan Tata先生的信任,拥有66%的塔塔的儿子。他没有绝对的权力就像他的前任拉丹•塔塔(Ratan Tata)的主席。
规则3
监管3内幕交易规则的规定,未发表的股价敏感信息应该共享在需要知道的基础上严格和不沟通的人不参与交易的不管他们的位置在公司或与启动子和高级管理层的关系。
这个规则是受到印度证券交易委员会在10月3日订单停Piramal企业和它的主要推动者,Ajay和斯瓦特Piramal披露未公开股价敏感信息,他们的儿子Anand Piramal事务。Anand,虽然启动子集团的一部分,无论是导演还是公司的一个员工。
塔塔问题略有不同。Mistry的下台的原因之一应该是他不愿沟通在早期对塔塔Tata Sons董事会权力的决定购买Welspun可再生能源的可再生能源业务。Tata Sons恼怒的,沟通是他们交易的批准后由塔塔电力董事会和股东协议的签署。他们也想要一个说在决定塔塔桑塔塔是一个主要股东权力。但他们承认,Tata Sons董事会了解决定购买Welspun权力。
这个需求是否违反了印度证券交易委员会的内幕交易规则还有待观察。一些公司律师,包括帕尔克Finsec Advisors的认为它是我的。“印度证券交易委员会的规则是清晰的,没有内幕应该沟通,提供或允许访问未发表的有关公司股价敏感信息,包括其他业内人士,“说Suhail Nathani,执行合伙人、经济法律实践。
“机密信息与交易的官员透露塔塔的塔塔电力董事会儿子违反公司法以及印度证券交易委员会规定的内幕交易规定,”帕尔克说。
印度证券交易委员会也在研究是否股价敏感信息向塔塔桑董事和披露塔塔信托提名之前运营公司董事会的批准。
“我们注意到事件展开的塔塔公司和检查是否有任何违反证券法,”印度证券交易委员会的一位高级官员说。他拒绝进一步透露,但补充说,监管机构将下定决心在接下来的几天里。
塔塔集团的一位发言人,回复一个问卷,表示,该集团已在这个问题上,将传达到印度证券交易委员会。他拒绝详细说明。
Sebi内幕交易规则规定,价格敏感信息被共享只有needto-know基础上和高管没有决定之前的事不应该通知董事会的决定。这应只包括董事会成员名单,不是外人,包括启动子的亲属的家庭。
居鲁士Mistry说,塔塔电力了演讲的首席执行官Tata Sons Welspun董事会的效用主要的收购可再生能源和关键塔塔信托受托人是讨论的一部分。
邮件的前主席Tata Sons委员会于10月25日还说,信托公司的董事(Nitin Nohria和维杰辛格)留下了Tata Sons董事会会议,董事会保持等待将近一个小时,获得Ratan Tata的指示。
SUPERBOARD”结构是违反规定的
“这样的工作模式也违反内幕交易规则创造了额外的风险,”Mistry说。邮件被公开后,这是第一次,还透露,战略决策等并购和资本支出计划由塔塔实体需要批准,塔塔桑塔塔的多数选票Trusts-nominated董事会。
章程第121条(AoA)的塔塔桑州的某些战略决策运营公司塔塔的儿子董事会批准。决议的通过,它需要一个“赞成票”多数董事的提名,塔塔塔塔桑董事会信托。这塔塔(多数投票通过信托提名董事)成立于2014年。
公司治理专家和律师们的尖锐批评这种做法。前印度证券交易委员会主席说,这(交战规则)是对印度证券交易委员会的内幕交易规则的精神和公司的行为。塔塔集团有29家上市公司。”作为农产品协定的结果,所有的塔塔公司,实际上有一个不是superboard负责个别公司的股东,他们面临贬值的风险在这一过程中,“Rajiv Kumar说,政策研究中心高级研究员。
superboard的结构违反了规则,要求所有上市公司的董事会是独立和自主,独立的决策使公司的最佳利益。Section 166的公司法规定,公司董事应当诚实守信,促进公司的对象为其成员的利益作为一个整体,在该公司的最佳利益。
“尽管公司的董事由股东任命,他们的主要职责是对公司也受到法律的约束,在该公司的最佳利益,而不是在其多数股东的最佳利益,”Sandeep帕克尔说的创始人Finsec法律顾问和印度证券交易委员会的执行董事。居鲁士Mistry历史上是第一个主席塔塔桑148岁的塔塔集团的主席不是塔塔信托基金,主要是塔塔先生Dorabji信任和Ratan Tata先生的信任,拥有66%的塔塔的儿子。他没有绝对的权力就像他的前任拉丹•塔塔(Ratan Tata)的主席。
规则3
监管3内幕交易规则的规定,未发表的股价敏感信息应该共享在需要知道的基础上严格和不沟通的人不参与交易的不管他们的位置在公司或与启动子和高级管理层的关系。
这个规则是受到印度证券交易委员会在10月3日订单停Piramal企业和它的主要推动者,Ajay和斯瓦特Piramal披露未公开股价敏感信息,他们的儿子Anand Piramal事务。Anand,虽然启动子集团的一部分,无论是导演还是公司的一个员工。
塔塔问题略有不同。Mistry的下台的原因之一应该是他不愿沟通在早期对塔塔Tata Sons董事会权力的决定购买Welspun可再生能源的可再生能源业务。Tata Sons恼怒的,沟通是他们交易的批准后由塔塔电力董事会和股东协议的签署。他们也想要一个说在决定塔塔桑塔塔是一个主要股东权力。但他们承认,Tata Sons董事会了解决定购买Welspun权力。
这个需求是否违反了印度证券交易委员会的内幕交易规则还有待观察。一些公司律师,包括帕尔克Finsec Advisors的认为它是我的。“印度证券交易委员会的规则是清晰的,没有内幕应该沟通,提供或允许访问未发表的有关公司股价敏感信息,包括其他业内人士,“说Suhail Nathani,执行合伙人、经济法律实践。
“机密信息与交易的官员透露塔塔的塔塔电力董事会儿子违反公司法以及印度证券交易委员会规定的内幕交易规定,”帕尔克说。
评论
现在评论 阅读评论(1)所有评论
找到这个评论进攻?
下面选择你的理由并单击submit按钮。这将提醒我们的版主采取行动