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By Manasvi Srivastava
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Semiconductor<\/a> chip<\/a>s are ubiquitous and in short supply. Some nations have decided that they are a part of their national security and economic security. The current squeeze in chip supply has led to the proposed Chips for America Act, European Chips Act, China’s subsidies for chip manufacture and India’s recently announced incentive schemes for semiconductor manufacture.
In addition to the supply squeeze, another prominent factor impacting the industry is geopolitics. Strained relations between countries could impact the supply of these goods which apart from being components of computers, electronics<\/a>, and other consumer goods could also be components of military equipment. These factors lie behind the effort by some countries to secure the supply chain for products of the semiconductor industry.
Semiconductor industry<\/strong>
The industry itself consists of multiple sub-sectors. While the number of branches could be numerous, the industry can broadly be divided into three product categories, processors\/controllers, memory and & other products. The first category includes processors, chips used in modems, routers and controllers for consumer and industrial machinery. This category is dominated by the largest corporations in the semiconductor market. The second category of memory products is served by some of the large companies that make processors as well but there are also a few large companies that specialize mainly in memory products. The third category of products includes semiconductors used in sensors, communication devices<\/a>, power management etc. The third category of products is manufactured by a larger number of smaller companies spread across industrialized countries.
Leading manufacturing regions<\/strong>
Let us look at the current global distribution of the semiconductor value chain<\/a>. As of 2021-22, Taiwan, South Korea and China supply the largest amount of semiconductor products, followed by US and Japan at the next rung, with EU at a lower level followed by other smaller players. Two decades ago the picture was different with USA, EU and Taiwan having the largest share in semiconductor manufacture.
Geographical spread of the value chain<\/strong>
The overall manufacturing supply chain of semiconductors is rather complex with intellectual property originating in a few regions, capital goods such as equipment for deposition, lithography, and other processes, manufactured by companies in very few countries and fabs (facilities for manufacturing semiconductors, which require huge capital investment) located primarily in East Asia, China, Taiwan, and US. There is no country that can be said to be self-sufficient in the semiconductor value chain which is dispersed across a few locations. This dispersal has emerged due to the requirement of huge investments in research and development, design, and manufacturing. At the same time, it is pertinent to note that the value chain spans only a handful of countries.
Attracting investment<\/strong>
While it is neither possible nor advisable for the value chain to be present in most countries, the squeeze in supplies and perceptions of economic and physical security are prompting some countries to invest in attracting as many components of the value chain to their territories as possible. This is the context in which the US, China, EU, and Indian initiatives for attracting investment in semiconductor manufacturing have arisen.
An old trick from the book of trade could have been the raising of protective tariffs so that a sheltered market is provided to manufacturers in a country. However, most governments cannot easily raise tariff barriers on semiconductor products, being bound by commitments under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA<\/a>), a plurilateral agreement under the aegis of WTO<\/a>. Notwithstanding the commitments under ITA, in the past a few governments have indeed imposed duties on some information technology products by interpreting the ITA in the light of technological changes.
In addition to tariffs, technical requirements notifiable under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT<\/a>) agreement of WTO could be deployed in order to nudge semiconductor fabricators to spread their footprint across countries. Whether this does happen in future remains to be seen. As mentioned earlier, some governments are turning towards providing financial incentives for setting up research and development, design, manufacturing, assembly, testing and packaging facilities in their jurisdictions. Such financial support is meant to change the economics favourably towards setting up new operations or expanding existing operations in relevant countries. In addition to these incentives, there could also exist certain opportunities in fiscal systems of countries which when coupled with incentive regimes could become attractive propositions. Yet another factor to be kept in mind is the export control regime of the host nation.
Factoring in geopolitics and trade<\/strong>
There is little doubt that geopolitical developments and national and regional priorities of large markets will shape future value chains. Such factors will need to be viewed in conjunction with the economics of supply chains and availability of skilled manpower while taking decisions on locating manufacturing, research, or design facilities. Since the investments involved for the semiconductor sector will be huge in financial terms, corporate entities will need assurance of long-term policy certainty from governments. Such policy certainty would need to cover national regulations, export controls, import tariffs, non-tariff, or technical barriers to trade, financial incentives and taxation.
As this situation plays out, we may see a geographical dispersal of semiconductor manufacturing that is significantly different from today. A new order could result from corporations’ reading of the geopolitical and trade trends, cost-benefit assessments and negotiations between corporate entities and national\/regional trading blocks.
(The writer is Partner – Trade and Customs, KPMG in India)<\/em>
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由Manasvi斯利瓦斯塔瓦
半导体 芯片年代是无处不在的,供不应求。一些国家已经决定,他们的国家安全和经济安全。当前芯片供应紧缩导致了该芯片为美国,欧洲芯片,中国补贴芯片制造和半导体制造印度最近宣布的刺激计划。
除了供应紧缩,另一个重要的因素影响行业的是地缘政治。国与国之间的紧张关系可能会影响这些商品的供应,除了组件的计算机,电子产品和其他军事装备的消费品也可以组件。这些因素背后的努力,一些国家获得供应链产品的半导体行业。
半导体行业
行业本身由多个部门组成。虽然可能分支的数量众多,但行业大致可以分为三个产品类别,处理器/控制器,内存,和其他产品。第一类包括处理器、芯片用于调制解调器、路由器和控制器为消费者和工业机械。这一类是由半导体市场最大的企业。第二类的内存产品的一些大公司,使处理器,但也有一些大公司,专业主要在内存产品。第三类中使用的产品包括半导体传感器,交流设备、电源管理等。第三类的产品是由大量的小公司分布在工业化国家。
主要生产地区
让我们看看当前全球分布的半导体价值链。2021 - 22,台湾,韩国和中国供应最多的半导体产品,其次是美国和日本在下一响,下级与欧盟其他小公司紧随其后。二十年前的照片是不同的美国、欧盟和台湾在半导体制造最大的份额。
价值链的地理分布
半导体的整体制造业供应链与知识产权起源于一些相当复杂的地区,资本货物如设备沉积、光刻、和其他流程,公司生产的很少有国家和晶圆厂(设施制造半导体,这需要巨大的资本投资)位于主要是在东亚,中国,台湾,和我们。没有国家,可以说是自给自足的半导体价值链中分散在几个位置。这传播出现了由于巨额投资在研究和发展的要求,设计和制造。同时,注意,是相关的价值链跨度只有少数国家。
吸引投资
虽然既不可能也不可取的价值链的存在于大多数国家,供应和感知的紧缩经济和物理安全,促使一些国家在吸引投资作为价值链的许多组件自己的领土。这是美国的环境,中国,欧盟,印度计划吸引出现在半导体制造业的投资。
书的老把戏贸易可能是保护关税的提高,这样一个受保护的市场提供给制造商的国家。然而,大多数政府无法轻易提高关税壁垒在半导体产品,遵守承诺根据信息技术协议(ITA),一种复边协议的庇护下世贸组织。尽管ITA下的承诺,在过去一些政府确实对一些信息技术产品征收关税通过解读ITA的技术变革。
除了关税外,技术要求须申报的技术贸易壁垒(下技术性贸易壁垒)世贸组织协议可以部署为了推动各国半导体制造商传播他们的足迹。这是否会发生在未来仍有待观察。正如前面提到的,一些政府转向提供财政激励建立研发、设计、制造、组装、测试和包装自己辖区内的设施。这样的财政支持是为了改变经济积极对建立新的业务或扩大现有业务相关的国家。除了这些激励,也可能存在某些机会加上激励制度的国家的财政系统可能成为有吸引力的主张。另一个因素是牢记东道主的出口控制机制。
考虑到地缘政治和贸易
毫无疑问,地缘政治与国家和地区优先发展的大市场将塑造未来的价值链。这些因素需要被结合供应链和可用性的经济学熟练的劳动力同时决定定位制造、研究、或设计设施。因为半导体行业所涉及的投资将是巨大的在金融业务方面,公司实体需要保证政府的长期政策确定。这样的政策必然需要覆盖国家法规,出口管制,进口关税,非关税,或技术贸易壁垒、财务激励和税收。
这种情况中,我们可以看到一个地理分散的半导体制造业显著不同于今天。新订单可能会从公司的阅读的地缘政治和贸易趋势,成本效益评估和企业实体和国家/地区之间的谈判交易。
(作者是合作伙伴——贸易和海关,毕马威在印度)
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