In courts of law there is the doctrine of necessary and proper parties, without whose presence a case cannot be properly decided. This comes to mind in WhatsApp<\/a>’s court challenge to the central government’s IT Rules as this case is inevitably about you, the average internet user.
The IT Rules, which were notified on February 25, 2021, bring in additional compliance for social media companies with more than 5 million users. It includes an obligation to implement a technical system called “traceability”. This ties the identity of the originator of the message to the message and became effective on May 26, 2021.
This has spurred WhatsApp<\/a> to go before the high court of Delhi, causing a media maelstrom. This case has obvious implications for the privacy<\/a> and cybersecurity of about 400 million users. To understand the implications let us start from the first principles of technical and legal impacts of traceability.
Given the likelihood you are a WhatsApp user, you may have seen a conspicuous notice when you open it – your messages are protected by end to end encryption. This is a technology that utilises a technical design called the signal protocol and ensures that your messages cannot be read by WhatsApp during the course of transmission. This helps prevent not only your messages from being accessed by third parties but also guards against a whole range of cyber security<\/a> risks. Encryption helps keep your conversations private and safe.
It is the contention of the government that enables a whole range of illegality. For instance, disinformation that leads to mob lynching or reprehensible actions such as sharing of non-consensual sexual imagery of women and minors. Officials argue that the solution to this is finding out the identity of persons who first compose such messages and are its originators.
The “traceability” proposal has its proponents. Professor Kamakoti from IIT Madras has argued that it can be implemented with a few simple tweaks. However, Professor Prabhakar from IIT Bombay argues there are risks and a lack of utility in its deployment. He says, “The effectiveness is likely to be limited.”
The problem is that even minor changes in a message, for example capitalisation or a single punctuation, create a completely new data entry, thereby undermining the objective of tracing the originator. For large viral messages that are broadcast thousands of times, this will happen frequently when people forward messages adding their own commentary.
This technical and common sense critique is buttressed by a report from the Internet Society. This report, a work of around 50 experts, points to potential cyber security<\/a> concerns from implementing traceability. It says once WhatsApp and platforms like Signal and Telegram build in traceability, cybercrimes like impersonation, financial frauds, surveillance and social profiling are likely.
In August of 2017 the Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the fundamental right to privacy<\/a> and laid down clear principles on how it can legally be limited when there is a justifiable need. A restriction on privacy requires a parliamentary law that has a constitutional purpose and is proportional. It means the least restrictive measure will be implemented and all alternatives which do not harm privacy, or restrict it in the least possible manner, must be explored. This helps maintain the balance between a fundamental right and a reasonable restriction, where individual liberty is safeguarded.
However, as explained above, due to technical risks, traceability is more of an overly broad measure. As the Internet Society warns: “Service providers would be forced to access the contents of users’ communications, greatly diminishing the security and privacy of a system for all users and putting national security at greater risk.” Viewed in this perspective, the HC petition by WhatsApp does articulate a goal which is supportive of the right to privacy.
But is WhatsApp a wider champion for our user privacy? Not quite. It itself has rolled out an update to its privacy policy<\/a>, which gives no choice to opt out. This update allows greater data sharing<\/a> with Facebook<\/a>. This has separately been challenged in the Delhi HC.
While last weekend some news reports indicated WhatsApp won’t downgrade services for users who do agree to this change, most users have already been pretty much coerced to click, “I agree.” In its challenge the Union government has correctly objected to this privacy change by WhatsApp that did allow for user consent.
The Hamburg Data Protection Authority has restrained WhatsApp from making this change noting the new provisions, “further expand the close connection between the two companies in order for Facebook<\/a> to be able to use the data of WhatsApp users for their own purposes at any time”. The Competition Commission of India<\/a> has also commenced an investigation into this change in the privacy policy<\/a>.
These court battles are important. And, for close to 740 million Indian internet subscribers, it is important they understand that neither WhatsApp nor the government is completely supportive of their fundamental right to privacy. We must expect less from WhatsApp than our government. WhatsApp is a technology business. Our government, though, has the primary responsibility of protecting our constitutional rights.
What is the solution? A regulatory framework that is deliberated in the public domain and Parliament. One that identifies clear harms and creates solutions understanding the technical aspects and impacts on privacy. However, in the interim what looks most likely is that the duty of protecting our privacy will fall to our constitutional courts.
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WhatsApp案例是关于你的,普通的互联网用户。这里有几件事你必须知道
印度近7.4亿互联网用户,重要的是他们知道无论是WhatsApp还是政府完全支持他们的隐私权。比我们的政府。我们必须从WhatsApp期望少WhatsApp技术业务。然而,我们的政府的首要责任是保护我们的宪法权利。
由Apar古普塔
在法院的法律原则是必要的和适当的政党,没有他们的存在不能正确决定。想到这WhatsApp的法院挑战中央政府的规则,这种情况下是不可避免地对你,普通的互联网用户。
的规定,通知2月25日,2021年,带来额外的合规社交媒体公司拥有超过500万用户。它包括一个义务实现称为“可追溯性”的技术体系。这个消息的发起者的身份关系的消息,成为有效的5月26日,2021年。
这刺激了WhatsApp德里高等法院之前,导致媒体漩涡。这种情况下有明显的影响隐私和大约4亿用户的网络安全。了解影响我们从技术和法律的第一原则的影响可追溯性。
考虑到你是一个可能性WhatsApp用户,你可能见过一个明显注意到当你打开它——你的消息被端到端加密保护。这是一个技术,利用技术设计称为信号协议和确保您的信息不能读取过程中由WhatsApp传播。这不仅有助于防止你的邮件信息由第三方访问也防范一系列的网络安全风险。私人和安全加密有助于保持你的谈话。
政府的论点,使一系列的违法行为。例如,虚假信息导致暴民私刑或应受谴责的行为,如共享非双方自愿的性意象妇女和未成年人。官员认为,这是发现的解决方案的人的身份第一次写这样的信息和它的发起者。
“可追溯性”的提议有其拥护者。IIT马德拉斯Kamakoti教授认为,它可以实现一些简单的调整。然而,角色从IIT孟买教授认为有风险,缺乏实用程序的部署。他说,“可能是有限的有效性。”
问题是,即使是很小的变化信息,例如资本化或一个标点符号,创造一个全新的数据输入,从而破坏的目标跟踪发起人。对于大型病毒消息广播成千上万次,这经常会发生当人们转发消息添加自己的评论。
这一技术和常识批判是受到互联网协会的一份报告。这份报告,大约50名专家的工作,指出潜力网络安全实现可追溯性的担忧。它说一旦WhatsApp和平台信号和电报建立可追溯性,网络犯罪模拟,财务欺诈、监视和社会分析是可能的。
2017年8月印度最高法院重申的基本权利隐私和制定明确的原则如何合法是有限的,当有一个合理的需要。限制隐私需要议会法律,宪法目的和成正比。这意味着至少限制性措施实施和所有的替代品是不会造成伤害的隐私,或限制在最不可能的方式,必须探索。这有助于保持基本权利之间的平衡和合理的限制,个人自由的维护。
然而,如上所述,由于技术风险,可追溯性是过于广泛的措施。随着互联网协会警告称:“服务提供者将被迫访问的内容用户的通信,极大地减少系统所有用户的安全和隐私,危及国家安全更大的风险。“从这个角度看,HC请愿书WhatsApp表达一个目标,是隐私权的支持。
但WhatsApp更多冠军对我们的用户隐私吗?不完全是。它本身已经推出了一个更新隐私政策,没有选择退出。这个更新允许更大的数据共享与脸谱网。分别在新德里HC受到挑战。
尽管上周末一些新闻报道表明WhatsApp不会降乐动扑克级服务用户同意这个改变,大多数用户已经几乎强迫点击,“我同意。”挑战联盟政府正确地反对这种隐私改变WhatsApp,并允许用户同意。
汉堡的数据保护权威克制WhatsApp从注意的新规定作出这样的改变,“进一步扩大这两家公司为了之间的紧密联系脸谱网能够使用WhatsApp用户的数据在任何时间”为自己的目的。的印度竞争委员会也开始调查这一变化的隐私政策。
这些诉讼是很重要的。印度近7.4亿互联网用户,重要的是他们知道无论是WhatsApp还是政府完全支持他们的基本的隐私权。我们必须从WhatsApp预计低于我们的政府。WhatsApp技术业务。然而,我们的政府的首要责任是保护我们的宪法权利。
解决方案是什么?一个监管框架,是在公共领域和议会审议。一个标识清楚危害并创建解决方案理解技术方面和对隐私的影响。然而,在此期间看起来最有可能是保护我们隐私的责任将落在我们的宪法法院。
在法院的法律原则是必要的和适当的政党,没有他们的存在不能正确决定。想到这WhatsApp的法院挑战中央政府的规则,这种情况下是不可避免地对你,普通的互联网用户。
的规定,通知2月25日,2021年,带来额外的合规社交媒体公司拥有超过500万用户。它包括一个义务实现称为“可追溯性”的技术体系。这个消息的发起者的身份关系的消息,成为有效的5月26日,2021年。
这刺激了WhatsApp德里高等法院之前,导致媒体漩涡。这种情况下有明显的影响隐私和大约4亿用户的网络安全。了解影响我们从技术和法律的第一原则的影响可追溯性。
考虑到你是一个可能性WhatsApp用户,你可能见过一个明显注意到当你打开它——你的消息被端到端加密保护。这是一个技术,利用技术设计称为信号协议和确保您的信息不能读取过程中由WhatsApp传播。这不仅有助于防止你的邮件信息由第三方访问也防范一系列的网络安全风险。私人和安全加密有助于保持你的谈话。
政府的论点,使一系列的违法行为。例如,虚假信息导致暴民私刑或应受谴责的行为,如共享非双方自愿的性意象妇女和未成年人。官员认为,这是发现的解决方案的人的身份第一次写这样的信息和它的发起者。
“可追溯性”的提议有其拥护者。IIT马德拉斯Kamakoti教授认为,它可以实现一些简单的调整。然而,角色从IIT孟买教授认为有风险,缺乏实用程序的部署。他说,“可能是有限的有效性。”
问题是,即使是很小的变化信息,例如资本化或一个标点符号,创造一个全新的数据输入,从而破坏的目标跟踪发起人。对于大型病毒消息广播成千上万次,这经常会发生当人们转发消息添加自己的评论。
这一技术和常识批判是受到互联网协会的一份报告。这份报告,大约50名专家的工作,指出潜力网络安全实现可追溯性的担忧。它说一旦WhatsApp和平台信号和电报建立可追溯性,网络犯罪模拟,财务欺诈、监视和社会分析是可能的。
2017年8月印度最高法院重申的基本权利隐私和制定明确的原则如何合法是有限的,当有一个合理的需要。限制隐私需要议会法律,宪法目的和成正比。这意味着至少限制性措施实施和所有的替代品是不会造成伤害的隐私,或限制在最不可能的方式,必须探索。这有助于保持基本权利之间的平衡和合理的限制,个人自由的维护。
然而,如上所述,由于技术风险,可追溯性是过于广泛的措施。随着互联网协会警告称:“服务提供者将被迫访问的内容用户的通信,极大地减少系统所有用户的安全和隐私,危及国家安全更大的风险。“从这个角度看,HC请愿书WhatsApp表达一个目标,是隐私权的支持。
但WhatsApp更多冠军对我们的用户隐私吗?不完全是。它本身已经推出了一个更新隐私政策,没有选择退出。这个更新允许更大的数据共享与脸谱网。分别在新德里HC受到挑战。
尽管上周末一些新闻报道表明WhatsApp不会降乐动扑克级服务用户同意这个改变,大多数用户已经几乎强迫点击,“我同意。”挑战联盟政府正确地反对这种隐私改变WhatsApp,并允许用户同意。
汉堡的数据保护权威克制WhatsApp从注意的新规定作出这样的改变,“进一步扩大这两家公司为了之间的紧密联系脸谱网能够使用WhatsApp用户的数据在任何时间”为自己的目的。的印度竞争委员会也开始调查这一变化的隐私政策。
这些诉讼是很重要的。印度近7.4亿互联网用户,重要的是他们知道无论是WhatsApp还是政府完全支持他们的基本的隐私权。我们必须从WhatsApp预计低于我们的政府。WhatsApp技术业务。然而,我们的政府的首要责任是保护我们的宪法权利。
解决方案是什么?一个监管框架,是在公共领域和议会审议。一个标识清楚危害并创建解决方案理解技术方面和对隐私的影响。然而,在此期间看起来最有可能是保护我们隐私的责任将落在我们的宪法法院。
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