Since 2004, the U.S. has replaced its auction rules with a streamlined administrative process for all satellite spectrums. Virtually all such experiments in the world have been abandoned and the practice of auctioning satellite spectrum has been replacedwith a globally adopted administrative process.
SIA-India would like to clarify that the examples of countries presented in a recent media article, besidesbeing the absolute exception in the global context, do not, in any way, lead to the conclusions on \u201cglobal trends\u201d, \u201crapidly gaining ground globally\u201d or \u201cincreasingly favored across the world\u201d.Suchmisleading statements that intentionally or unintentionally espouse disinformation can impact foundational decisions by the regulator and policy makers.
On the contrary, a deep dive into this issue with the referenced nations presents a totally different picture. The few countries that have attempted to auction the NATIONAL orbital resources, to which, of course, some spectrum will be associated, have failed and abandoned the practice and replaced it with an administrative allocation process. With good reason, it may be reiterated!
Exclusive terrestrial mobile services spectrum has to be managed by a single mobile operator in a given geographic area and, therefore, cannot be shared amongst the operators; while in the case of satellites, the same spectrum is non-exclusive in nature as it can be used by multiple satellite operators to serve the same geographic area.
In other words, assignment by auction for satellite spectrum that can be shared between operators, such as the C\/Ku\/Ka bands, would lead to unnecessary segmentation and can be deemed a very inefficient use of spectrum. For this reason, there are no precedents of spectrum assignment by auction to satellite services in these bands in any country.
Auction of frequency slots for Satellite spectrum usage are explained on the basis of the process being experimented in some of the countries like Saudi Arabia, Mexico etc. What is masked in this explanation is that the auction of spectrum being experimented is for the Orbital slots on geostationary arc along with the associated frequency spectrum.
The auctions mentioned in Mexico, Thailand and Brazil are not for \u201csatellite spectrum\u201d, but for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots. However, other satellite operators are still allowed, pending the relevant license\/authorization and satellite network coordination, to use the spectrum, as the spectrum, as such, is not being auctioned.
Furthermore, even the very few examples of auctions for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots have revealed to be mostly unsuccessful. For example, the last time Mexico did an auction for orbital slots allotted to Mexico was in 2014 that failed and it has not attempted this experiment again. A simple web search would bring up news related to this failed attempt.
Brazil abandoned satellite auctions completely in 2020 and replaced satellite auctions vide Law No. 9,472 of July 16, 1997, with administrative process that can be referred to at \u00a7 172, as amended by Law No. 13,879 of October 3, 2019. The consultation of this amendment specifically mentions \u201cIt is also important to highlight that an international benchmark study was carried out, seeking to assess how other administrations deal with the matter. Of the countries analyzed (8 in total), only Mexico adopts a bidding procedure for conferring rights, similar to the Brazilian case.Therefore, there is a mismatch between Brazilian procedures and those adopted by several countries with relevant satellite markets.\u201d
Of course getting this info would need more than a simple web search, but one needs to be diligent about such an important issue instead of making claims that are exactly opposite to the reality.Thailand tried to auction orbital slots in 2021 for the first time, but it was cancelled (only one bidder). Instead, Thailand will be assigning the slots administratively. Being a recent development, the details are available from multiple news sources across the internet.
In line with international best practices, auctioning of the Satellite spectrum is definitely not a desirable solution in the Indian context. An auction for satellite spectrum would artificially limit the number of satellite operators sharing the spectrum and exclude them from the market, as different from terrestrial mobile operators, multiple satellite operators can reuse the same frequency range. The need of the hour is an Open Sky Policy wherein the Satellite operators having capacity over India are permitted to provide full spectrum bandwidth to the Indian public in a competitive manner so that satellite capacity pricing is made available at an affordable level to all.
In any event, the international trend is clear, and it is against auctions. Very few countries have ever thought that auctions are an appropriate method even for assigning domestic satellite slots. The few who have, have either abandoned the practice (e.g. US, Brazil) or discovered the difficulties of such auctions (e.g. Thailand, Mexico).
To make the 5G auction a success and set up its base price, SIA-India requests TRAI that the non-issue of the auction of satellite spectrum be dismissed for what it is, a distraction to the core issue of identification of spectrum for 5G\/IMT and other complementary services including Satellite broadband services.","blog_img":"","posted_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","modified_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","featured":"0","status":"Y","seo_title":"Busting the myth of satellite spectrum auctions","seo_url":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions","url":"\/\/www.iser-br.com\/tele-talk\/busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions\/5208","url_seo":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions"}">
国际电联通过其无线电通信部门(ITU- r)及其执行机构无线电通信局(BR),是负责管理无线电频谱和卫星轨道资源的全球性机构。在国际电联的193个成员国中,包括美国、墨西哥和巴西在内的极少数国家曾尝试过拍卖
卫星光谱在过去。巴西于2020年修订了监管框架,以行政许可取代卫星拍卖。
自2004年以来,美国已经用简化的管理程序取代了所有卫星频谱的拍卖规则。实际上,世界上所有此类实验都已被放弃,拍卖卫星频谱的做法已被全球采用的行政程序所取代。
SIA-India我想澄清的是,最近一篇媒体文章中提到的国家的例子,除了是全球背景下的绝对例外之外,并不以任何方式得出“全球趋势”、“在全球迅速发展”或“在世界范围内越来越受欢迎”的结论。这种有意或无意支持虚假信息的误导性陈述可能会影响监管机构和政策制定者的基本决策。
相反,深入研究这些国家的这一问题会呈现出完全不同的画面。少数几个试图拍卖国家轨道资源(当然,一些频谱将与之相关)的国家都失败了,它们放弃了这种做法,代之以行政分配程序。有充分的理由,它可能会被重申!
专属的地面流动服务频谱必须由某一特定地理区域内的单一流动营办商管理,因此不能在营办商之间共用;就卫星而言,同一频谱本质上是非排他性的,因为多个卫星运营商可以使用它为同一地理区域服务。
换句话说,通过拍卖方式分配可由运营商共享的卫星频谱,例如C/Ku/Ka波段,将导致不必要的分割,并可被视为非常低效的频谱使用。因此,在任何国家都没有通过拍卖向这些波段的卫星服务分配频谱的先例。
根据沙特阿拉伯、墨西哥等国家正在试验的过程,对卫星频谱使用频率槽的拍卖进行了解释。这种解释掩盖的是,正在试验的频谱拍卖是针对地球同步弧上的轨道槽以及相关的频谱。
墨西哥、泰国和巴西提到的拍卖不是针对“卫星频谱”,而是针对国内备案/GSO轨道位。但是,在相关许可证/授权和卫星网络协调之前,其他卫星运营商仍然被允许使用频谱,因为频谱本身并没有被拍卖。
此外,即使是极少数的国内备案/GSO轨道槽拍卖的例子也显示出大多数是不成功的。例如,墨西哥上一次拍卖分配给墨西哥的轨道槽是在2014年,那次拍卖失败了,它再也没有尝试过这种实验。一个简单的网络搜索就能找到与这次失败的尝试有关的新闻。乐动扑克
巴西在2020年完全放弃了卫星拍卖,并根据1997年7月16日第9472号法律取代了卫星拍卖,其行政程序可参考§172,并经2019年10月3日第13879号法律修订。该修正案的咨询特别提到“同样重要的是,我们进行了一项国际基准研究,以寻求评估其他政府如何处理这一问题。在所分析的国家(共8个)中,只有墨西哥采用招标程序授予权利,这与巴西的情况类似。因此,巴西的程序与几个拥有相关卫星市场的国家采用的程序不匹配。”
当然,获得这些信息需要的不仅仅是简单的网络搜索,但一个人需要对如此重要的问题勤奋,而不是做出与现实完全相反的声明。泰国在2021年首次尝试拍卖轨道机位,但被取消了(只有一个投标人)。相反,泰国将以行政方式分配这些席位。作为最近的发展,细节可以从互联网上的多个新闻来源获得。乐动扑克
根据国际最佳实践,拍卖卫星频谱在印度肯定不是一个理想的解决方案。卫星频谱拍卖将人为地限制共享频谱的卫星运营商数量,并将它们排除在市场之外,因为与地面移动运营商不同,多个卫星运营商可以重复使用同一频率范围。目前需要的是开放天空政策,允许在印度拥有容量的卫星运营商以竞争性的方式向印度公众提供全频谱带宽,以便所有人都能负担得起卫星容量的价格。
无论如何,国际趋势是明确的,那就是反对拍卖。很少有国家认为拍卖是一种适当的方法,即使是分配国内卫星插槽。少数国家要么放弃了这种做法(如美国、巴西),要么发现了这种拍卖的困难(如泰国、墨西哥)。
为了使5G拍卖取得成功并确定其基本价格,SIA-India要求TRAI取消卫星频谱拍卖的非问题,分散对5G/IMT和其他补充服务(包括卫星宽带服务)频谱识别的核心问题的注意力。
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Since 2004, the U.S. has replaced its auction rules with a streamlined administrative process for all satellite spectrums. Virtually all such experiments in the world have been abandoned and the practice of auctioning satellite spectrum has been replacedwith a globally adopted administrative process.
SIA-India would like to clarify that the examples of countries presented in a recent media article, besidesbeing the absolute exception in the global context, do not, in any way, lead to the conclusions on \u201cglobal trends\u201d, \u201crapidly gaining ground globally\u201d or \u201cincreasingly favored across the world\u201d.Suchmisleading statements that intentionally or unintentionally espouse disinformation can impact foundational decisions by the regulator and policy makers.
On the contrary, a deep dive into this issue with the referenced nations presents a totally different picture. The few countries that have attempted to auction the NATIONAL orbital resources, to which, of course, some spectrum will be associated, have failed and abandoned the practice and replaced it with an administrative allocation process. With good reason, it may be reiterated!
Exclusive terrestrial mobile services spectrum has to be managed by a single mobile operator in a given geographic area and, therefore, cannot be shared amongst the operators; while in the case of satellites, the same spectrum is non-exclusive in nature as it can be used by multiple satellite operators to serve the same geographic area.
In other words, assignment by auction for satellite spectrum that can be shared between operators, such as the C\/Ku\/Ka bands, would lead to unnecessary segmentation and can be deemed a very inefficient use of spectrum. For this reason, there are no precedents of spectrum assignment by auction to satellite services in these bands in any country.
Auction of frequency slots for Satellite spectrum usage are explained on the basis of the process being experimented in some of the countries like Saudi Arabia, Mexico etc. What is masked in this explanation is that the auction of spectrum being experimented is for the Orbital slots on geostationary arc along with the associated frequency spectrum.
The auctions mentioned in Mexico, Thailand and Brazil are not for \u201csatellite spectrum\u201d, but for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots. However, other satellite operators are still allowed, pending the relevant license\/authorization and satellite network coordination, to use the spectrum, as the spectrum, as such, is not being auctioned.
Furthermore, even the very few examples of auctions for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots have revealed to be mostly unsuccessful. For example, the last time Mexico did an auction for orbital slots allotted to Mexico was in 2014 that failed and it has not attempted this experiment again. A simple web search would bring up news related to this failed attempt.
Brazil abandoned satellite auctions completely in 2020 and replaced satellite auctions vide Law No. 9,472 of July 16, 1997, with administrative process that can be referred to at \u00a7 172, as amended by Law No. 13,879 of October 3, 2019. The consultation of this amendment specifically mentions \u201cIt is also important to highlight that an international benchmark study was carried out, seeking to assess how other administrations deal with the matter. Of the countries analyzed (8 in total), only Mexico adopts a bidding procedure for conferring rights, similar to the Brazilian case.Therefore, there is a mismatch between Brazilian procedures and those adopted by several countries with relevant satellite markets.\u201d
Of course getting this info would need more than a simple web search, but one needs to be diligent about such an important issue instead of making claims that are exactly opposite to the reality.Thailand tried to auction orbital slots in 2021 for the first time, but it was cancelled (only one bidder). Instead, Thailand will be assigning the slots administratively. Being a recent development, the details are available from multiple news sources across the internet.
In line with international best practices, auctioning of the Satellite spectrum is definitely not a desirable solution in the Indian context. An auction for satellite spectrum would artificially limit the number of satellite operators sharing the spectrum and exclude them from the market, as different from terrestrial mobile operators, multiple satellite operators can reuse the same frequency range. The need of the hour is an Open Sky Policy wherein the Satellite operators having capacity over India are permitted to provide full spectrum bandwidth to the Indian public in a competitive manner so that satellite capacity pricing is made available at an affordable level to all.
In any event, the international trend is clear, and it is against auctions. Very few countries have ever thought that auctions are an appropriate method even for assigning domestic satellite slots. The few who have, have either abandoned the practice (e.g. US, Brazil) or discovered the difficulties of such auctions (e.g. Thailand, Mexico).
To make the 5G auction a success and set up its base price, SIA-India requests TRAI that the non-issue of the auction of satellite spectrum be dismissed for what it is, a distraction to the core issue of identification of spectrum for 5G\/IMT and other complementary services including Satellite broadband services.","blog_img":"","posted_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","modified_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","featured":"0","status":"Y","seo_title":"Busting the myth of satellite spectrum auctions","seo_url":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions","url":"\/\/www.iser-br.com\/tele-talk\/busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions\/5208","url_seo":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions"},img_object:["","retail_files/author_1623137801_13937.jpg"],fromNewsletter:"",newsletterDate:"",ajaxParams:{action:"get_more_blogs"},pageTrackingKey:"Blog",author_list:"Anil Prakash",complete_cat_name:"Blogs"});" data-jsinvoker_init="_override_history_url = "//www.iser-br.com/tele-talk/busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions/5208";">