The implications were that phones started to command a very high price due to concentration of market power (\u00e0 la static inefficiency). Around the same time, Qualcomm with its CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) technology adopted a completed different approach. Instead of manufacturing phones by itself, it decided to license out its new patented technologies to those who need them and empowering a host of manufactures in the process. This infused the market with competition, resulting in anexponential decline in prices of both GSM and CDMA phones to the benefit of consumers.<\/p>
Evolution of 3G and 4G platforms followed in the footsteps of CDMA\u2019s business model, with developers of these new and advanced technologies choosing to license them to all sorts of phone manufacturers. The result was an extraordinary drop in prices of 3G and 4G smartphones. The average selling price (ASP) of smartphones worldwide dropped by a staggering 35% from $440 in 2010 to $283 in 2016. In roughly the same period, the fall in ASP in China and India was 12% and 40%, respectively.<\/p>
This price drop was the real impetus that helped India cross the milestone of one billion mobile subscribers. This is also reflected in the market share of Indian smartphone vendors in the domestic market. While Samsung has a grip on 23% of the market, the combined share of leading Indian sellers, such as Micromax, Intex and Lava, stands at 35%. Micromax is now the third largest handset brand in Russia. Smartphones now seem lucrative even to those consumers who have a significantly high price elasticity of demand.<\/p>
The functioning of the standard development organizations (SDOs) and their IPR policies, play a key role in maintaining a delicate balance between companies pursuing diverse business models. While 3G and 4G are anchored by ETSI, IEEE is leading the development work for Wi-Fi technologies. Until recently, both SDOs had similar IPR polices. However, recently a small group of companies chose to unilaterally change the IPR policy of IEEE in face of huge opposition from the majority. These changes are bound to slow down (symptoms are already pointing in that direction) technological advancement of Wi-Fi technologies that are crucial for a wide range of sectors.<\/p>
These changes will adversely affect the licensing business model by unfairly tilting the delicate balance of the \u201cnegotiating leverage\u201d in favor of a handful of technology giants that have a sizable control over this standards body.Apart from the fact that it will exponentially decrease the value of patents \u2013 the most critical IPR for the industry \u2013 it will force innovators at the periphery to curtail R&D expenditure and innovation. Those governing the activities of IEEE stand to gain, just like the GSM players of the 1990s, as they do not have an advertised licensing model of enabling manufacturers to compete in the market.<\/p>
A recent study on patenting in telecom technologies in India found a total of 23,569 patents (granted & applied) between 2000 and 2015. Out of this, Indian firms accounted for mere 18 applications, with no patent issued so far. Local smartphone sellers, such as Micromax, Karbonn, Intex, Lava and Xolo, account for zero granted or pending patents. This is because these companies are merely assemblers of Semi Knockdown Kits that are imported from China. They virtually have no investments in design and R&D of meaningful technologies, since it is cheaper to import a manufactured PCB (where lies the maximum potential for R&D and design) compared to the finished handset. The PCB attracts a custom duty of 2% compared to a 12.5% duty on a finished handset.<\/p>
If India decides to align its IPR policy with that of IEEE then the value of IPR will erode drastically and it will extinguish the fire of innovation in the Indian companies, thereby compromising the ideals of \u201cMake in India\u201d and \u201cDesign in India\u201d. It will safeguard and sustain the authority of a select group of foreign companies who are currently market leaders in IEEE. Of course, these players can also restrict access to technology and know-how through other mechanisms (such as trade secrets) to appropriate returns to their own innovations but this would result in higher product prices. Not only will this mean \u2018harm\u2019 to consumers, it will also be detrimental to the pace of adoption and dissemination of technologies in the long run.<\/p>
<\/p>","blog_img":null,"featured":0,"status":"Y","seo_title":"Is the SEP, FRAND debate a battle of diverse business models?","seo_url":"is-the-sep-frand-debate-a-battle-of-diverse-business-models","cms_link":"is-the-sep-frand-debate-a-battle-of-diverse-business-models\/1500","updated_at":"2016-05-23 12:31:05","time":"2016-05-17 12:54:25","authors":[{"author_name":"Dr. Ashish Bharadwaj","author_description":"Professor and Dean, Jindal School of Banking & Finance","author_designation":"Professor and Dean","author_company":"Jindal School of Banking & Finance","profile_pic":"retail_files\/author_1463478204_temp.jpg"}],"tags":[],"url_seo":"is-the-sep-frand-debate-a-battle-of-diverse-business-models"}">
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在1990年代,全球移动(GSM)通信系统标准后成为无处不在的欧盟在1987年通过了一项立法授权标准的整个欧洲。最初,GSM技术的开发者是唯一的制造商和这个精英集团,包括西门子、爱立信、摩托罗拉和诺基亚,选择不许可该独家组GSM技术以外的任何人。相反,他们交换专利权的专利组合。
手机开始命令的含义是非常高的价格由于市场力量的浓度(la静态效率低下)。大约在同一时间,高通的CDMA(码分多址)技术采用了不同的方法完成。制造手机本身,而是它决定许可新专利技术,那些需要的人,让大量的制造过程中。这种市场注入了竞争,导致anexponential GSM和CDMA手机价格下降了消费者的利益。
3 g和4 g的进化平台的脚步CDMA的商业模式,这些新的和先进技术的开发人员选择许可他们各种各样的手机制造商。结果是一个非凡的3 g和4 g智能手机价格的下降。全球智能手机的平均售价(ASP)从2010年的440美元下降了惊人的35%到283年的2016美元。大约在同一时期,ASP的下降在中国和印度是12%和40%,分别。
这个价格下降是真正的动力,帮助印度交叉十亿手机用户的里程碑。这也反映在印度的市场份额智能手机厂商在国内市场。而三星控制23%的市场,印度领先的联合份额卖家,如Micromax、国际展览中心和熔岩,达到35%。Micromax现在在俄罗斯第三大手机品牌。智能手机现在看来赚钱甚至那些有相当高的消费者需求的价格弹性。
标准开发组织(sdo)的功能和他们的知识产权政策,发挥关键作用在维护公司之间的一种微妙的平衡追求多样化的商业模式。虽然3 g和4 g是由ETSI, IEEE领导wi - fi技术的开发工作。直到最近,sdo也有类似的知识产权政策。然而,最近一小群公司选择单方面改变IEEE的知识产权政策面对巨大的多数人的反对。这些变化必然会减慢(症状已经指向那个方向)wi - fi技术的科技进步是至关重要的,范围广泛的行业。
这些变化将影响不公平倾斜的许可的商业模式“谈判筹码”的微妙的平衡有利于少数科技巨头这个标准组织有一个相当大的控制权。除了将成倍地减少专利的价值——最关键的行业的知识产权——它将迫使创新者在外围削减研发开支和创新。这些管理活动的IEEE站来获得,就像1990年代GSM的球员,他们没有一个广告许可模型,使制造商能够在市场上竞争。
最近的一项研究在电信技术专利在印度发现共有23569项专利(授予&应用)在2000年和2015年之间。的,印度公司占仅仅18个应用,到目前为止没有专利发表。当地智能手机卖家,如Micromax Karbonn,国际展览中心,熔岩和Xolo占0授予或未决专利。这是因为这些公司只是半击倒的汇编器套件从中国进口。他们几乎没有投资在设计和研发有意义的技术,因为它是更便宜的导入生产PCB(谎言最大潜力研发和设计)而完成的手机。PCB吸引了2%的关税而完成手机12.5%的关税。
如果印度IEEE的决定使其知识产权政策与知识产权的价值将大幅削弱,它将灭火在印度公司的创新,从而危及“印度”的理想和“设计在印度”。它将保护和维持的外国公司的权威在IEEE目前市场领导者。当然,这些玩家还可以通过其他机制限制技术和技术诀窍(如商业秘密)适当回报自己的创新,但这将导致产品价格上涨。这不仅意味着“伤害”的消费者,它也将不利于采用和传播技术的步伐。
