Ten years ago, only 12 out of 100 people in India had phone connections. Since then the Indian telecom market has leapfrogged achieving a teledensity of 80% now, and active smartphone subscribers crossing 220 million. One of the main factors for Indian telecom revolution can be mapped to the availability of technologies to indigenous low cost smartphone manufacturers. The dichotomy in the Indian telecom industry is that despite the huge revenue potential due to the growing number of subscribers and penetration of mobile technologies in rural area, the propensity to innovate in mobile communication technologies is abysmally low.<\/p>

<\/p>

In the domestic market, top three Indian manufacturers (Micromax, Intex and Lava) hold over 30% of market share. However, they do not hold any patents in India on chipsets, processors, communication networks and other core mobile technologies; and they hold only a handful of patents and that too on software related to audio and keyboards. Although Indian firms have design studios, their focus is on hardware development (such as casing, batteries and chargers) and further localization of components imported from elsewhere. Therefore, the dependence is understandably on more innovative and research-oriented firms that have patent portfolios for technological standards such as 3G, 4G and LTE.<\/p>

<\/p>

The holders of these standard-essential patents (SEP) have to commit to provide them on reasonable and non-discriminatory license terms to device manufacturers who cannot afford to miss taking part in the great mobile revolution. The difference in understanding what constitutes a reasonable return on these essential patented technologies has led them to knock on the doors of courts and competition commission. While the SEP holder is fighting against patent infringement and trying to get suitable return on its investment, devise manufacturers are desperately trying to prove anticompetitive behavior on the part of the patent holder for seeking excessive royalties. Homegrown mobile phone sellers, Micromax and Intex, \u2018informed\u2019 the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in mid 2013 of anticompetitive practices by Ericsson, which was prima facie<\/em> found by the commission. This was after the parties individually failed to sign a patent licensing agreement with negotiations spanning 3-4 years not yielding any result. The most important arguments CCI relied upon were (1) thrusting manufacturers with a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), and (2) seeking royalties that were not uniform across \u2018similarly situated\u2019 players. The antitrust watchdog seems to have erred on both counts. It acted in haste by not taking into account the interim arrangement ordered by the Delhi High Court, which held that NDAs are legitimate and sine qua non<\/em> in every licensing deal, particularly in patent licensing.<\/p>

<\/p>

NDAs become necessary safeguards for any party that is reliant on high-tech inventions and, by extension, on holding, managing or using intellectual property rights embedded in those inventions. NDAs are antecedent to any negotiation process, and are a versatile and valuable tool for both licensor and licensee. During the negotiation, Intex had revealed that it was rather unaware of the infringement and of the underlying patents essential to the functioning of technologies in their devices, such as those that conserve use of bandwidth and enhance speech quality in 2G and 3G enabled smartphones. It sought confidential details of infringing patents, without signing a NDA, to discuss with its vendors in China from whom it was importing the device.<\/p>

<\/p>

According to the NDA used by the Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), a telecom technology development centre of the government of India administered by the DoT, in collaborative R&D arrangements and technology transfer deals, confidential information includes \u2018any information on design, fabrication & assembly drawings, know-how, processes, product specifications, raw materials, trade secrets, market opportunities, or business or financial affairs or their customers, product samples, inventions, concepts and any other technical and\/or commercial information\u2019. Licensing of deals between patent holders and manufacturers of devices using the patented technology would typically cover details of underlying patents (granted or pending patents) and a variety of business-related financial and market information. While the latter concerns both parties, information on patents is absolutely crucial to the holder\u2019s business.<\/p>

<\/p>

The discussion paper recently released by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) on standard essential patents seems to have followed CCIs order having a gestated notion of \u201cNDAs being abusive\u201d. So far perhaps no judicial body in US, which has a much more evolved jurisprudence in this area, has found NDA-based patent licensing arrangement to be anticompetitive. Finding NDAs per se<\/em> abusive seems to be overstretching the contours of abusive instruments and anticompetitive behavior. It is absolutely essential for DIPP to fully understand the benefits of non-disclosure agreements between businesses entering into patent licensing deals involving standard essential patents.<\/p>

<\/p>

The current government is striving to boost the telecom sector and has assured to implement measures to enhance ease of doing business in India by attracting foreign investors and innovative companies. The debate around non-disclosure agreements being misconstrued as anticompetitive and abusive in the context of SEPs is misconceived and decision makers need to understand the grave implications of this. Other than the adverse impact on the growth of the industry, it also has implications for India\u2019s ranking in the \u2018ease of doing business\u2019 index which can be enhanced, among other parameters, by making contracts more enforceable and ensuring that confidential information of companies especially in high-innovation, high-tech and high-stake smartphone industry is not tinkered with.<\/p>

(The article is co-authored by Girish Nagaraj, Research Analyst, Jindal Global Law School)<\/strong><\/p>

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    维护机密商业信息不是反竞争

    博士阿施施巴拉
    • 博士阿施施巴拉,教授、院长,金达尔学院的银行和金融业,
    • 2016年8月12日更新是03:04点

    十年前,只有12的100印度人电话联系。自那以后,印度电信市场已超越实现现在的电话密度为80%,和主动智能手机用户突破2.2亿。印度电信革命的一个主要因素可以被映射到技术的可用性本土低成本智能手机制造商。印度电信行业的二分法是巨大的收入潜力,尽管由于越来越多的用户和移动技术在农村地区的渗透,移动通信技术的创新倾向是极度地低。

    在国内市场,三大印度制造商(Micromax、国际展览中心、熔岩)持有超过30%的市场份额。然而,他们并不持有任何专利在印度芯片组,处理器、通信网络和其他核心移动技术;和他们也只有少数专利和软件相关的音频和键盘。尽管印度公司有设计工作室,他们的重点是硬件开发(如外壳、电池和充电器),进一步从其他地方进口的本地化组件。因此,依赖是可以理解更多的创新和研究型公司专利组合等技术标准的3 g, 4 g LTE。

    这些standard-essential专利的持有人(SEP)必须提交给他们提供合理的和非歧视性的许可条款设备制造商谁不能参加最伟大的移动革命小姐。理解的差异构成了一个合理的回报这些基本专利技术使得他们敲的门法院和竞争委员会。虽然9月持有人是打击专利侵权,并试图得到合适的投资回报率,设计制造商正努力证明反竞争行为的专利持有者寻求过度的版税。国产手机卖家,Micromax国际展览中心,“通知”印度的竞争委员会(CCI)在2013年中期爱立信的反竞争行为,这是初步由该委员会发现的。这是双方单独未能签署专利授权协议长达3 - 4年的谈判没有产生任何结果。CCI依赖最重要的论点是(1)把制造商和保密协议(NDA),和(2)寻求版税没有统一在同样位置的球员。韩国反垄断监管机构似乎在这两方面都有错。在匆忙行动不考虑临时安排德里高等法院下令,保密协议,是合法的,必要条件在每一个许可协议,特别是在专利实施许可。

    保密协议成为任何一方的必要保障,是依赖于高科技的发明,推而广之,持有、管理或使用知识产权嵌入在这些发明。保密协议是前期任何谈判过程,是一个多才多艺的许可方和被许可方的和有价值的工具。谈判期间,国际展览中心透露,而是不知道潜在的侵权和专利必要技术的功能在他们的设备,比如那些节约使用带宽,提高语音质量启用2 g和3 g智能手机。它寻求的机密细节侵犯专利,没有签NDA,讨论其在中国的供应商与谁是进口设备。

    根据使用的NDA中心远程信息技术(C-DOT)的发展,电信技术发展中心的印度政府管理的点,在协作研发安排和技术转让协议,保密信息包括的任何信息在设计、制造和装配图纸、技术、流程、产品规格、原材料、贸易机密、市场机会、或业务或财务或顾客,产品样本,发明,概念和其他技术和/或商业信息”。授权专利持有者和制造商之间的交易的设备使用基本专利的专利技术通常涉及细节(授予或正在申请的专利)和各种业务相关的金融和市场信息。而后者涉及双方,信息专利持有人的业务是至关重要的。

    讨论论文最近公布的工业政策和促销(DIPP)标准重要专利似乎跟着CCIs秩序孕育保密协议“滥用”的概念。到目前为止可能没有司法机构在美国,有一个在这个领域更进化的法学,发现NDA-based专利实施许可安排反竞争。发现保密协议本身虐待似乎过度伸长的轮廓的仪器和反竞争行为。对DIPP来说是绝对有必要完全理解的好处之间的保密协议企业进入专利实施许可交易标准重要专利。

    目前政府正在努力提高电信部门,并保证实施措施,加强在印度做生意的缓解吸引外国投资者和创新型企业。辩论在保密协议被误解为反竞争和虐待的上下文中SEPs误解和决策者需要理解的严重影响。除了负面影响增长的行业,这也暗示了印度的“经商”指数排名,可以增强,在其他参数,通过合同更具可执行性,并确保机密信息的公司特别是高创新、高科技和高风险的智能手机行业不是修修补补。

    (这篇文章是由Girish Nagaraj、研究分析师,金达尔全球法学院)

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    • 通过博士阿施施巴拉,教授、院长,金达尔学院的银行和金融业
    • 2016年8月12日更新是03:04点