<\/p>
The spunk of standard setting <\/strong><\/p> Among many factors, technical standards played a critical role in defining our new technology-led economies, the future of which is predicated on thriving competition, nurturing innovation and building respect for intellectual property rights. Contemporary standards are becoming ubiquitous in today\u2019s markets. Standards, such as WiFi capability or 3G\/4G communication, foster interoperability, avoid inefficient rivalry between competing systems, and facilitate competition in product markets. The conventional narrative is that firms, that commit their patents to a standard, abuse their market dominance by demanding excessive royalties from technology implementers and by seeking injunction order against infringers of their standard-essential patents. Competition agencies around the world generally prevent collaborations among competitors, but they are not hostile of voluntary standard setting by competitors in technologies that rely on principles of interoperability and compatibility. Standards certainly involve a risk of anti-competitive abuse since the adoption of a standard eliminates competition between competing technologies, which could lead to consumer harm. To mitigate this risk, patent holders, especially in high technology industries, typically provide an assurance that they will license patents that they have committed to a standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms to anyone who wises to use them.<\/p> <\/p> The quintessential European decision: Huawei versus ZTE <\/strong><\/p> In 2015, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) \u2013 the highest court in the European Union in matters of European Union Law \u2013 held that a SEP holder\u2019s refusal to license on FRAND terms may<\/em> be<\/em> an abuse of dominance in violation of Article 102 TFEU (i.e., an abuse of dominant position under EU competition law). One of the key questions regarding the circumstances under which seeking a claim for injunction would amount to an abuse of dominance was answered by CJEU in Huawei vs. ZTE <\/em>after years of prolonged ambiguity and diverging opinions of the German Federal Court of Justice. CJEU\u2019s decision laid down terms under which holder of a FRAND-compliant SEP can seek injunctive relief and further removes some vagueness in understanding of what constitutes an \u2018unwilling licensee\u2019. It is now up to the national courts of individual member states of EU to apply CJEU\u2019s general framework and implement their guidelines to resolve questions that have been left unanswered by the CJEU.<\/p> <\/p> The opinion of the CJEU was that action of a holder of FRAND-committed SEP of brining an action for infringement seeking an injunction or product recall would not amount to an abuse of dominant position, if (1) (a) prior to brining the action, the SEP holder alerts the alleged infringer of the infringement by designating the patent in question and providing details of the infringement; (b) the SEP holder presents a specific written offer to licence \u2013 after the infringer expresses a willingness to execute a licensing agreement on FRAND terms \u2013 with clear specifications of how royalty was calculated. (2) the alleged infringer continues to infringe on the said patent and does not diligently reciprocate to the licence offer proposed by the SEP holder, as per established commercial practices and in good faith, or adopts delaying tactics. CJEU also imposed requirements on the SEP implementer. The alleged infringer who chooses to not accept the initial offer can invoke Article 102 TFEU defence only if it submits to the SEP holder, promptly and in writing, a counteroffer on FRAND terms. The decision essentially enhanced the restrictions already placed on the alleged infringer\u2019s behaviour in FRAND negotiations by applying EC\u2019s safe harbour provision, striking a bargain between the Orange Book<\/em> decision of the Federal Court of Justice and the earlier (Samsung<\/em> and Motorola)<\/em> decisions of the European Commission.<\/p> <\/p> Recent developments in Deutschland: Down but not out<\/strong><\/p> Germany has always been a preferred litigation forum in Europe, especially in SEP matters, making it the centre of gravity for smartphone litigation. Since German courts have historically been rather lenient in granting injunctions in patent infringement, the burden of proof lies mainly on the defendants when they invoke a competition law defence. Three major and recent decisions of German Courts developed case law on injunctive relief to the patent holder in cases dealing with infringement of SEPs, applying the rules established by CJEU in its Huawei vs. ZTE<\/em> decision. The Regional Courts of Dusseldorf and Mannheim in Germany addressed some of these questions in Sisvel vs. Haier <\/em>(November 2015), SLC vs. Deutsche Telekom <\/em>(January 2016) and NTT DoCoMo vs. HTC GmbH <\/em>(June 2016). In all three decisions, the SEP holder was granted injunctive relief against the infringing implementer, and the courts held that the SEP holder\u2019s conduct did not amount to an abuse of dominant position. However, in Sisvel vs. Haier<\/em>, an interim order was issued suspending the injunction order. It was found that the decision of the lower court was based on evident flaws in the application of the Huawei vs. ZTE requirements. The lower court wrongly assumed that the initial offer from the SEP holder was FRAND compliant. Although these decisions are currently under appeal, they throw light on application of the Huawei vs. ZTE <\/em>decision in admissibility of FRAND defence in SEP infringement cases. <\/em>Competition law of the European Union has taken a prominent role in the ICT sector that has always been more patent and SEP-intensive. Even though the litigants in these cases are global, but non-European companies, the fact that Europe was chosen as the forum for patent litigation highlights the importance of EU cases and decisions in matters of SEPs.<\/p> <\/p> FRAND or foe: What is in it for India? <\/strong><\/p> India needs a functional market for technologies that balances the interests of innovators, who rely on incentives to further develop technologies that enhance industrial capabilities, and the interests of implementers, who rely on these technologies to make standard-compliant devices. This balance will be disturbed if the incentives for innovators are constrained in ways that are commercially unviable, or when access to technologies is hindered by strategic and opportunistic behaviour of the patent owner. Either way, an environment is created where innovation is ultimately at a suboptimal level. The lesson for an Indian implementer can be that if it chooses to reject a \u2018reasonable\u2019 and \u2018fair\u2019 license offer from a SEP holder (which it very well can for an unrealistic proposal), it may leave the SEP holder with no choice other than suing for infringement if the implement continues with its business. Injunctive relief as a statutory remedy may be justified in cases where breach of promise to charge FRAND royalties as a defence cannot be proved by the licensee. FRAND terms, in essence, are a range of royalty rates calculated on the basis of reciprocity and a royalty base, keeping in mind the duration, scope and geographic markets that can encompassed as part of the agreement. In SEP matters in India, the implementers were found to be \u2018unwilling licensees\u2019 by the high court that found their actions as tactics for delaying negotiations, and in the process, continue commercial success of their infringing products.<\/p> Oversight of the process of standardization by a competition agency is indeed crucial. There is a lot we can learn from the emerging European jurisprudence. Seeking injunctions against licensees that are ready and willing to enter into a license agreement and are blocked by the SEP holder is indeed anticompetitive, and warrants scrutiny (and sanctions) by competition authority. More generally, market power acquired by SEP holders through anticompetitive market behaviour during the standard setting process necessitates scrutiny by competition agency. The enquiry, however, should focus on alleged holdup and harm to competition, rather than a perception of harm to consumers and competitors. Taking injunction off the table for SEP holders, or equating it with abusive behaviour, will certainly force them to forego significant and valuable licensing revenues as well as making them bear full cost of litigation and uncertainty. What we must understand is that our legal and regulatory systems should not undercompensate innovators and SEP holders by overlooking infringement; or overcompensate patent holders by overlooking abusive behaviour Implementers of technologies have a massive role to play to ensure India\u2019s steady growth in mobile communication sector, but they cannot hide behind a cloak of a willing licensee to delay the negotiation process of technologies that have a very short lifeline. The responsibility is on creators to make their technologies accessible, and also on implementers that help integrate the market by making valuable products reach the end consumer.<\/p> <\/p>","blog_img":null,"featured":0,"status":"Y","seo_title":"Technology: Time to implement what we have learnt","seo_url":"technology-time-to-implement-what-we-have-learnt","cms_link":"technology-time-to-implement-what-we-have-learnt\/2187","updated_at":"2017-02-23 13:17:51","time":"2017-02-21 18:35:41","authors":[{"author_name":"Dr. Ashish Bharadwaj","author_description":"Professor and Dean, Jindal School of Banking & Finance","author_designation":"Professor and Dean","author_company":"Jindal School of Banking & Finance","profile_pic":"retail_files\/author_1463478204_temp.jpg"}],"tags":[],"url_seo":"technology-time-to-implement-what-we-have-learnt"}">
我们生活在动荡时期,其特点是快速的技术变革带来麻烦的法律之间的冲突,是不可分割的一部分,一个正在进行的漩涡的突破和中断。消费者和企业稳定的大量有价值的技术发挥了重要作用在塑造我们的世界——这个世界十年前是非常不同的。十年前,这个词可以很容易地将Android与《星际迷航》引用混淆。十年前,2007年1月作为第一个iPhone发布,商业史上最伟大的复出是照本宣科。苹果从700亿美元的市值攀升至近6000亿美元,成为世界上最有价值的公司。十年前,当RIM推出最畅销的黑莓手机,相机第一次加载,它不知道命运会刺从控制世界上一半的智能手机市场2017年不到1%。十年前,三星正艰难应对触摸屏革命,现在占每四个世界上智能手机销售。十年前,小米和Micromax并不存在。如今,它们却成为了五大和十大世界上最大的移动业务,分别。 标准设定的怒意 众多因素,技术标准起到了重要的作用,在定义我们的新技术主导的经济体的未来是建立在激烈的竞争,培养创新和构建对知识产权的尊重。在今天的市场当代标准变得无处不在。标准,比如WiFi功能或3 g / 4 g通信,促进互操作性,避免低效竞争系统之间的竞争,促进产品市场的竞争。公司的传统叙事,提交专利标准,滥用市场主导地位要求技术实现者和过度的版税,通过寻求禁令秩序standard-essential专利侵权行为。全球竞争机构通常防止竞争对手之间的协作,但它们并不是敌对的自愿标准设置的竞争对手的技术依赖于互操作性和兼容性原则。标准当然涉及滥用反竞争的风险由于采用标准消除竞争技术之间的竞争,这可能导致消费者的伤害。减轻这种风险,专利持有者,特别是在高技术产业,通常提供一个保证他们将许可的专利,他们致力于标准公平、合理、非歧视的(弗兰德)条款而明智的人使用它们。 典型的欧洲决定:华为和中兴 2015年,欧盟法院(CJEU)——欧盟最高法院在欧盟法律问题——认为9月持有人拒绝许可在弗兰德可能是一个滥用市场支配地位的行为违反第102条TFEU(即。,一个在欧盟竞争法)滥用优势地位。的一个关键问题在何种情况下寻求禁令将索赔金额的滥用市场支配地位的行为被CJEU回答华为和中兴经过多年的长期模棱两可和德国联邦法院的不同意见。CJEU决定制定条款持有人FRAND-compliant SEP可以进一步寻求禁令救济,删除一些模糊性的理解什么是一个不愿被许可方。现在取决于个别成员国的欧盟的国家法院申请CJEU的总体框架和实施他们的指导方针来解决CJEU一直未被解答的问题。 CJEU是行动的观点的持有者FRAND-committed 9月用盐水浸泡一个行动寻求禁令的侵权或产品召回数量不会滥用优势地位,如果(1)(a)用盐水浸泡行动之前,9月持有人警报的涉嫌侵权人侵权通过指定的专利侵权问题和提供细节;(b) 9月持有人提供了一个具体的书面提供许可证之后,侵权人表示愿意弗兰德上执行一个许可协议条款,明确规范的皇室是如何计算出来的。(2)涉嫌侵权人继续侵犯该专利,不努力报答牌照9月持有人提出的报价,根据建立的商业实践和诚信,或采用拖延战术。CJEU也强制要求9月实现者。涉嫌侵权人选择不接受最初的提议可以调用第102条TFEU国防只有提交9座,迅速在写作,在弗兰德的还价。本质上增强的限制的决定已经放置在弗兰德涉嫌侵权人的行为通过应用电子商务中的安全港条款,谈判之间的讨价还价橙皮书联邦法院的决定和早些时候(三星和摩托罗拉)欧盟委员会的决定。 最近的事态发展在德国:但不是 德国一直是首选的诉讼论坛在欧洲,特别是在9月很重要,这使得智能手机重心诉讼。自德国法院历史上相当宽容给予禁令在专利侵权,被告的举证责任主要在于当他们调用竞争法辩护。三个主要的和最近的决定德国法院判例法发展禁令救济专利权人在SEPs侵权案件处理,应用规则由CJEU建立的华为和中兴的决定。杜塞尔多夫的地区法院和德国曼海姆解决其中的一些问题Sisvel与海尔(2015年11月),SLC和德国电信(2016年1月)NTT DoCoMo和HTC GmbH是一家(2016年6月)。在所有的三个决定,9月持有人获得禁令救济对侵权实现者,和法院认为9月持有人的行为并不意味着滥用优势地位。然而,在Sisvel与海尔,一个临时订单暂停禁令发布订单。发现下级法院的决定是基于明显的缺陷在华为和中兴通讯的应用需求。下级法院错误地假定初始提供从9月持有人是弗兰德兼容。尽管这些决定正在上诉,他们照亮的应用华为和中兴决定在可容许的弗兰德9月国防侵权案件。欧盟竞争法的ICT部门已经采取了重要的作用,一直是更多的专利和SEP-intensive。即使当事人在这些情况下是全球性的,但非欧洲公司,被选为欧洲专利诉讼的论坛突出欧盟病例和决策的重要性SEPs。 弗兰德还是敌人:什么是在印度吗? 印度需要一个功能技术,平衡市场创新者的利益,那些依靠激励进一步发展技术,提高工业能力,和利益的实现者,他们依靠这些技术标准兼容的设备。这种平衡会被打扰,如果激励创新者是商业化的约束方式,或者当访问技术阻碍了战略和专利所有者的机会主义行为。无论哪种方式,最终将创造一个环境,创新是在理想水平。的教训印度实现者可以,如果它选择拒绝“合理”和“公平”许可协议提供的9座(很好可以为一个不现实的建议),它可能离开9月持有人比起诉侵权,没有其他选择,如果实现继续其业务。禁令救济作为法定救济可能是合理的情况下,违反承诺给弗兰德版税国防不能被证明是由被许可方。弗兰德来说,本质上,是一个范围的费率计算的基础上互惠和皇室基地,记住时间,范围和地理市场可以包含作为协议的一部分。9月在印度的情况而言,实现者是“不许可”的高等法院发现他们的行为作为拖延谈判的策略,并在此过程中,继续侵权产品的商业上的成功。 监督过程的标准化竞争机构确实是至关重要的。有很多我们可以学习的新兴欧洲法学。寻求禁令对许可,准备好了并且愿意签订许可协议,并被9座的确是反竞争的,和认股权证的审查(制裁)竞争权威。更普遍的是,市场力量获得9月持有者通过反竞争的市场行为在标准制定过程中需要审查机构的竞争。然而,询问应该关注涉嫌抢劫和伤害竞争,而不是损害消费者和竞争对手的感觉。禁制令表9月持有者,或者将它等同于虐待行为,肯定会迫使他们放弃重要的和有价值的许可收入以及诉讼承担全部成本和不确定性。我们必须明白的是,我们的法律和监管制度不应该undercompensate创新者和9月持有者俯瞰侵权;或过度补偿专利持有者俯瞰虐待行为实施者的技术有巨大的作用,以确保印度的移动通信行业的稳定增长,但是他们不能躲在被许可方所愿的斗篷推迟谈判过程的技术,有一个非常短的生命线。创造者的责任是使其技术可访问,并通过有价值的实现者,帮助整合市场上的产品到达终端消费者。
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